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INTRODUCTION
Threat background
As technology advances and computing power continues to become more
and more miniaturized, commercial small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), more
commonly known as “drones,” are becoming more prevalent. These systems are
defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Title 14 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 107.3 as a small unmanned aircraft and its
associated elements. While there are many beneficial uses of sUAS including
photography, building and tower surveys, search and rescue applications, and
geospatial uses, there are more nefarious uses that are concerning from a physical
security standpoint. Drones have been used to attack the Venezuelan president, land
undetected on the property of the White House, and to deliver crude explosives to
troops in the Middle East (Gramer, 2017; Grossman, 2018; Wallace & Loffi, 2015).
Indeed, current physical security protocols are proving too costly or ineffective to
stop unwanted sUAS activity.
Within the United States, an alarming number of prisons have reported use
sUAS to drop contraband to inmates. Reports from Maryland, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, South Carolina, and other states have described the use of these systems
to air-drop heroin, cell phones, and blades to prisoners (“United States,” 2016). In
California, 45 “unauthorized drone intrusions” were recorded between July 2017
and May 2018, some of which were found to have successfully smuggled cell
phones, drugs, and saw blades putting correctional officers and other inmates at risk
(Harvey, 2018; Kotowski, 2018). In South Carolina, a drone was used to give
personnel locations and deliver wire-cutters to assist a convict in a prison break.
After a manhunt, the criminal was re-apprehended ("Dedrone," 2019).
Challenge
Many prisons struggle to implement an effective counter unmanned aerial
systems (C-UAS) detection program tailored to the typical UAS threat they
encounter and do not have enough funding for a robust C-UAS protocol (Otte,
2017). Additionally, even well-funded organizations are finding effective C-UAS
solutions for fixed sites a challenge, as evidenced by a March 2019 solicitation by
the Department of Defense admitting, “It has proven difficult to identify and
mitigate threats,” in regard to its bases, installations, and facilities (NC DefTech,
2019). Common characteristics of UAS intrusions to prisons include using
minimally modified commercial off-the-shelf platforms from manufacturers such
as DJI and Yuneec. This gives threat sUAS some unique characteristics that can be
used to develop tailored and low-cost solutions that are specific to this problem.
Modeling and UAS Security
Currently, the ability to interdict drones is illegal outside of certain Federal
entities. Agent-based modeling may serve as an appropriate venue to test counter
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UAS policies and techniques without legal consequences. Technical data can be
programmed into a model to represent a geographical space, a sensor, an
interdiction device, a threat UAS, and a facility footprint. Modeling may be an
appropriate method to provide data to guide policy revisions involving counter
UAS operations. Once a model is built, it can be used to validate the security
procedures of a fixed site, while different scenarios can be used to test and refine
the security policy and implementation. This data may provide lawmakers with
insights to make legal revisions necessary for corporations and non-federal entities
to protect themselves with C-UAS technology currently restricted from use.
Research Question
Given a hypothetical C-UAS sensor performance data and fixed C-UAS
interdiction characteristics, what are the effects of a threat unmanned aerial
vehicle’s speed on detection and interdiction of a C-UAS designed to protect a 40acre facility from threat UAS overflights?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Threat UAS Characteristics
FAA sUAS guidelines affecting manufacture.
Current threats to U.S. prison systems involve ‘low-tech’ offenders using
commercially available sUAS from manufacturers such as DJI, Yuneec, and Parrot
and minimally modifying them for the purposes of intrusive overflight and
contraband smuggling. Manufacturers adhere to FAA regulations regarding the use
of and operation of sUAS, which gives these threats several common characteristics
that can be used in detecting, tracking, and integrating interdiction methods.
Title 14 C.F.R §107.31 requires that a remote pilot is within visual line of
sight of the sUAS at all times and able to re-direct the aircraft (e-CFR, 2019).
Typically this will place the remote pilot no further than one mile from the aircraft
where visual tracking and obstacle avoidance becomes very challenging (UAV
Coach, 2020). The control channel for DJI offerings, such as the Phantom 4,
typically send control inputs from the radio control module on the 2.4 GHz
wavelength, and image transmission is broadcast back from the aircraft to the
control station over the 5.8 GHz wavelength (DJI, 2019). DJI reports the
controllable signal strength of this UAS to be just over four miles. A similar Yuneec
offering, the Typhoon 4K, transmits control inputs over the 2.4 GHz bandwidth and
sends video signals back to the control system over the 5.8 GHz range as well
(Yuneec, 2018). This control transmission architecture is not uncommon for
commercial offerings and may be used to interdict trespassing sUAS. This also
excludes the possibility of legal autonomous flight and requires that a remote
controller can control the aircraft, as opposed to the capability of ‘high-tech’
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offenders to use pre-programmed GPS waypoints and flight routes for autonomous
flight.
Title 14 C.F.R. §107.29 restricts sUAS operation during night hours. While
the flight performance characteristics are not different at night, most of the control
systems for commercial sUAS involve visual sensors for flight orientation and
obstacle navigation. Night flight is therefore difficult without upgrading to
expensive night visual optics and possible aircraft modifications, which would push
the offender into the ‘high-tech’ category as well. For the purposes of this paper,
‘low-tech’ threats will be considered and modeled, as they are the primary sUAS
threat encountered by prisons.
Popular sUAS performance characteristics.
The primary threat and common thread in the reviewed cases of unwanted
UAS intrusions involving prisons is using commercial-off-the-shelf platforms with
slight modifications for accepting and jettisoning a payload. The DJI Phantom 4
Pro is a popular UAS and can fly up to a maximum of 45 mph in ideal atmospheric
conditions and in a clean configuration with no payload (DJI, 2019). This UAS has
a retail price of approximately $1,700 and requires an Apple iPhone or iPad to
operate. Additionally, DJI offers a robust and powerful flight control software that
is intuitive and ideal for low experience sUAS pilots. This aircraft is consistent with
the price point, power and specifications of reported prison intrusions and will be
used as an initial basis from which to model flight behavior (Rubens, 2018).
C-UAS Sensor Types and Characteristics
As of December of 2019 a report highlighted that there are 537 C-UAS
products and systems offered by over 277 different companies (Michel, 2019). The
products range from detection only, interdiction only, or a mix of both. Detection
methods include radar, radio-frequency tracking, electro-optical, infrared, acoustic,
and mixed sensors. No single detection method has proven to be without fault, so
often integrated systems use a mix of detection sensors. Interdiction methods can
include radio-frequency jamming, global positioning system (GPS) jamming,
spoofing, laser, nets, and projectiles (Michel, 2019). Table 1 represents a brief
summary of UAS detection sensors.
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Table 1
Types of Detection Sensors and Descriptions
Sensor Type
Radar

RadioFrequency

Electro-Optical

Description
Detects radar signature by emitting radio wave pulses and
analyzing return energy to determine the range, angle, and
velocity
Detect UAS presence by scanning commonly used UAS
bands such as 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz, may be able to
determine location with complex antennas and multiple
sensor locations
Detect UAS based on the visual signature of the UAS aircraft

Infrared

Detect UAS based on the infrared signature emitted by the
UAS aircraft
Acoustic
Detect changes in sound by using microphones and software
filters to match data from a database UAS audio signatures
Note. Descriptions are adapted from Michel (2018, p. 4).
For the purposes of this study, the hypothetical sensor used in modeling will
be largely based on integrated acoustic UAS sensors since there is very limited data
available with other sensors that can be used for simulation modeling, and this
sensor type is typically lower in cost than other sensor types.
Acoustic sensor characteristics.
Acoustic means of sUAS detection typically rely on microphone arrays that
are coupled with audio analysis software. Simply stated, a microphone array
consists of several microphones positioned at a single site with positional offsets
that allow for bearing and azimuth estimations based on the slight differences
between the timing and intensity of the sound reaching each microphone. The
detection range of these systems can be affected by multiple elements such as
microphone quality and sensitivity, ambient noise, weather conditions, and
software packages.
French-German Research Institute of Saint-Louis (ISL) conducted audio
drone detection testing using four Brüel & Kjaer type 4189 metrological
microphones (Christnacher et al., 2016). The research team was only able to
accurately detect (in azimuth and elevation) a customized drone 20 seconds away
from the sensors when the drone was directly traveling towards the sensor.
However, the sensor array was able to continuously track the drone for 45 seconds
when it was flying away. In ISL’s 2016 experiment, the audio sensor array reached
the longest detection range of up to 300 meters when testing against the DJI
Phantom 2 at an altitude ranging from 120 to 150 feet. While there is no acoustic
data specifically on the Phantom 4, the Phantom 2 is a close alternative.
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Additionally, from data gathered by Guvenc, Koohifar, Singh, Sichitiu, &
Matolak (2018), the detection range of different acoustic sensors ranges from 20
meters to 600 meters, mainly depending on drone types and sensor arrangement.
According to Bernardini et al. (2017), their acoustic detection algorithms have
accuracy ratings ranging from 0.964 to 0.992 when distinguishing UAS noises from
different environmental noises. The lowest accuracy being in a crowd and street
with traffic, while the highest rating was in natural daytime. These algorithms,
however, do not account for limitations encountered by distance, ambient
conditions and specifications of microphones.
The hypothetical sensor characteristics used for this study will be modeled
largely after acoustic sensors as there is more available operational data for this
sensor type than others, and it meets the intent for developing a low-cost solution
for identifying threat sUAS.
Interdiction Agent Characteristics
UAS interdiction involves the disruption of the threat sUAS flight path by
one or more methods, with a goal of threat mitigation or minimizing perceived risk
from the unwanted activity. Table 2 represents a summary of different interdiction
methods currently employed (Michel, 2018). It is important to note that currently
UAS interdiction operations are illegal in the U.S. outside of the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and
Department of Justice.
Table 2
Types of Interdiction Methods Currently Employed
Sensor Type
Radio Frequency
(RF) Jamming

Description
Interrupts the RF link between UAV and operator by
generating large amounts of RF output. Once the RF link is
disturbed, the UAV will land or return to the operator.
GNSS Jamming
Interrupts the satellite link used for navigating. Once the
satellite link is lost, UAV will hover, land, or return to the
operator.
Spoof
Taking control of the UAV by hijacking the
communications link
Kinetic
Destroys portions of the airframe with directed energy,
causing a crash
Net
Entangles the UAV or its rotors
Projectile
Employs ammunition to destroy UAV
Combination
Several C-UAS methods employed – commonly tandem RF
and GNSS jamming
Note. Descriptions are adapted from Michel (2018, p. 4)
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In 2016, a Michigan Tech research team demonstrated the effectiveness of
a proof-of-concept anti-UAS net-launcher mounted on what appears to be a DJI
Matrice 600 (Goodrich, 2016). This team later filed for and received a patent for
their system which is able to aim the net projectile and carry the intruding UAS to
a safe location for handling, mitigating human risk due to explosives or other
potentially hazardous cargo (Aagaah et al., 2018).
In 2017, another research team from Purdue University demonstrated the
effectiveness of a completely autonomous C-UAS detection and interdiction
system involving a radar tracking system and autonomous hunter drone equipped
with an ultra-light carbon-framed conical net (Goppert et al., 2017). The net design
was selected to allow multiple attempts at interdiction of a threat in the event the
autonomous positional data was too imprecise for a launched-net entanglement.
The threat UAS was flown at a set altitude over a set path toward a protected object.
The radar in use was described as a “high-precision” and “military” radar (Goppert
et al., 2017, pp. 236, 238). This high-fidelity radar would be excellent for proving
autonomous interdiction is possible but is largely outside of the budget and
manpower available to prisons and other fixed facilities. Hunter type drone
characteristics will be modeled for the interdiction agent in this study.
Prison Characteristics for Modeling Consideration
Like many other prisons across the country, there have been reports drones
have been used to smuggle contraband within the security perimeter of the Indiana
State Prison (J. E. Dietz, personal communication, September 20, 2018). Indiana
State prison is a level four maximum-security prison located in Michigan City,
Indiana which houses approximately 2,400 inmates (State of Indiana, 2019). The
walled area spans 24 acres and the adjacent field is approximately another 18 acres
(see Figure 1). These dimensions will be used to geographically represent the
protected facility within the simulation model.
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Figure 1. Indiana State Prison footprint of approximately 40 acres (Google Maps,
2020)
METHOD
This section discusses the research framework, approach, tools of
measurement, variables, and assumptions used in this article.
Research Framework
This research paper explores the usefulness of agent-based modeling
software for adjusting and determining parameters that could lead to a successful
C-UAS detection system. Simulation modeling software has the unique ability to
quickly adjust parameters and gather data and should provide insights that should
transfer over to real-world systems, and bypass current legal restrictions on testing
and implementation of C-UAS interdiction. Later iterations are intended to refine
threat, sensor, and system behaviors. This will be done with a goal of identifying
parameters for recommending system specifications for a comprehensive detection,
tracking, and interdiction system for common commercially manufactured threats.
AnyLogic modeling software will be used to replicate the geometric space, threat
UAS, hypothetical C-UAS sensors, and an interdiction agent.
This study is designed to test an abstracted fixed counter unmanned aerial
system that is designed to prevent overflight of a fixed facility representing an
abstracted prison or compound. Parameters for agents will be discussed in later
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sections and are designed to replicate probable integrations of equipment that may
be purchased for these purposes. Data will be collected for 50 iterations of each
varying threat speed, while all other C-UAS behaviors remain the same between
iterations.
Model Characteristics
Threat UAS characteristics.
The DJI Phantom 4 Pro specifications will be used to model the threat
aircraft characteristics. This UAS is capable of speeds up to 45 mph under ideal
conditions with no other payload other than the integrated camera on-board. Adding
a payload will lower the top speed and affect the center of gravity and other flight
controllability characteristics. The modeled threat UAS was spawned .75 miles
away from the protected facility outside of sensor detection range, and at the far
end of feasible line-of-sight tracking (UAV Coach, 2020). The threat UAS was
flown in a pattern as dictated by 100 “attractors” selected randomly, one after the
other, as depicted in Figure 2. There were 50 attractors placed evenly within the
bounds of the protected facility, and an additional 50 attractors spanning the
remaining space surrounding the facility. The simulation was run with threat speeds
set at 25, 27.5 30, 32.5, 35, 36, 37.5, and 40 mph to collect sample data in each
speed category.
Facility characteristics.
The simulation model contains a .25 x .25-mile (40 acres) square that will
be used to indicate the footprint of the protected facility. A ‘failure’ within an
iteration is defined as the threat UAS overflying the footprint of the protected
facility, regardless of the duration of overflight.
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Figure 2. The physical representation of the model space used in the experiment
Hypothetical sensor model characteristics.
A hypothetical sensor will be used for modeling based on an average of
performance characteristics of Bernardini et al. (2017) and listed specifications of
DroneSheild as reported by Birch et al. (2015) for ranging and success probability.
The hypothetical sensor will be assumed to provide cueing to a higher fidelity
electro-optical sensor. For the purposes of this study cueing and additional
functionality will be abstracted into the specifications listed in Table 3.
Table 3
Hypothetical sensor model parameters and values.
Sensor Type:
OmniParabolic dish
directional
Effective Range 150 m / 495 ft 1000 m / 3280 ft
Detection Angle
300°
30°
Analysis Time
Frame
SVM Success
Rate

Hypothetical
575 m / 1890 ft
165°
5 second frames
96.4%

Note. Analysis time and success rate derived from works by Bernardini et al. (2017, p.
63) and range and angle adapted from Birch et al. (2015, p. 27).
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Interdiction agent model characteristics.
The DJI Matrice 600 Pro specifications will be used to model the
interdiction aircraft characteristics. This UAS is capable of speeds up to 40 mph,
no wind or excess payload (DJI, 2020). The simulation model will be using this as
the fixed C-UAS interdiction speed. The model assumes that there will be an
attached ultra-light net similar to the one used in a 2017 study by Goppert et al., in
which a conical net and carbon-fiber housing were attached to a similar platform
for the purposes of entangling threat UAS. The effects on top speed, the center of
gravity, and other flight controllability characteristics have not been considered
with the net attached for the purposes of this study. The C-UAS will be placed in
the center of the protected facility and will track to the threat 10 seconds after the
sensor detects the threat UAS. This will be the assumed time for cueing from the
sensor to the interdiction agent.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The model was built based on an abstracted facility footprint, hypothetical
C-UAS sensor performance data and fixed C-UAS interdiction characteristics.
After this framework was established and the agent behaviors set, the only variable
manipulated in the model for each set of samples collected was the sUAS threat
speed, which was set at the beginning of each iteration. These individual fixedspeed simulations were allowed 50 iterations of each run. The runs were
documented and the threat UAS fixed speed was adjusted for the next set of
simulations. Eight fixed-speed simulation sets were run, altering the threat UAS
speed at 25 mph, 27.5 mph, 30 mph, 32.5 mph, 35 mph, 36 mph (added to explore
the critical failure speed for this hypothetical system), 37.5 mph, and 40 mph and
recorded each time. The results are recorded in Table 5.
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Table 5
Model Simulation Results
Threat Speed
(MPH)

Avg I - D Time
(s)

Std. Dev. (s)

Overflights

40.0

59.2

30.4

72%

Avg
overflight
time (s)
18.2

37.5

50.8

23.4

54%

14.0

36.0

48.8

19.2

56%

13.0

35.0

35.5

9.9

4%

1.5

32.5

32.0

5.9

0%

0

30.0

33.9

5.7

0%

0

27.5

33.0

4.4

0%

0

25.0

34.6

3.8

0%

0

Note. I-D Time represents the interdiction time minus the detection time in seconds. 36
MPH was added to further explore the relationship between speed and system failure.

Predictably, the amount of ‘failures’ or overflights of the protected facility
increase as the threat speed increases. Interestingly, however, the overflights
increase rapidly between 35 mph and 37.5 mph. Another 50 trials were run to
determine if there was a linear relationship between the threat speed and failures of
the system. From 35 mph to 36 mph the overflights increased from 4% to 56% of
the trials respectively.
This is interesting in that there is a large jump in system “failures” within a
very small increase in speed. Subsequent research may be needed to identify the
critical speed delta between the interdiction agent and the threat UAS to better
determine the point at which the system's effectiveness is degraded.
The data from this experiment suggest that a 5 MPH or greater speed delta
is required between the expected threat UAS and a hypothetical system designed as
outlined in this study. Figure 3 displays the large increase in variance present when
the difference in speed changes from 5 mph to 4 mph to 2.5 mph and 0 mph between
the threat sUAS and interdiction UAS respectively.
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Figure 3. Interdiction time - Detection time at Various Speeds
The distributions in each category are generally right skewed with very
close lower limits. This is due to the high success rates of the hypothetical C-UAS
system for threats that follow a straight flight path toward the protected facility.
Since half of the attractor points were located within the protected facility, this type
of flight pattern was common. As the threat speed increases, the variance increases,
as can be seen by larger box areas in the graph for each speed category. The higher
tail grows drastically larger in the categories that have less than a 5-mph difference
between the interdiction or ‘hunter’ UAS and the threat UAS.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship threat UAS speed
has on a set C-UAS system that might be typical for a fixed facility such as a
prison. Additionally, the second goal of this study was to explore the usefulness
of agent-based modeling software as a future tool for adjusting and determining
parameters that could ultimately lead to a cost-effective C-UAS detection and
interdiction system for fixed facilities. Data was gathered that provide insights
that may apply to real-world systems.
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This study suggests that there is a critical threat speed in which the variance
between detection to interdiction times drastically increases along with subsequent
system failures. The critical threat speed will depend on sensor performance, the
geographic position of the sensors in relation to the protected facility, and
interdiction characteristics. The goal of a fixed facility C-UAS system is to mitigate
the threat, or in this case, prevent overflights of the facility. Agent-based simulation
modeling may be a useful tool for establishing system parameters when careful
consideration is applied in replicating the environment, threat, and parts of the
whole C-UAS system.
The threat agent was given behavior based on commands to fly to a random
sequence of attractors around the protected facility with the largest concentration
within the facility. Further investigation will be conducted prior to future research
if there are better methods to model this threat behavior. Threat speed was set
initially at the start of each simulation. Future works may add in a speed variability
into the behavior of the agent to replicate more real-world threats. The simulation
took place primarily in a two-dimensional plane. The third dimension was
replicated with a changing variable that was not fully accounted for within the
interdiction behavior. Future research will try to integrate the third dimension more
natively, which will have an added benefit of providing more visually appealing
simulations. Additionally, although the threat UAS was given semi-random
behavior based on attractors distributed around the facility, there was only one
spawn point for the threat UAS, which will likely be addressed in further iterations.
Sensor data was based on a hypothetical sensor, since there is a general lack
of real-world performance characteristics of C-UAS sensors. As better data
becomes available, more realistic sensor data will be modeled in future works. A
96.4% probability seems rather high for an SVM accuracy rating, and perhaps a
distance tiered probability would be appropriate for such sensors if data is available.
Interdiction ‘warm-up’ time may need to be lengthened past ten seconds to
replicate more real-world conditions. Further investigation will be conducted on
similar integrated systems as data becomes available. As system complexity
increases, communication delays due to cueing and data transmission may be added
into the model logic.
CONCLUSION
This study suggests that there is a critical threat speed for a hypothetical CUAS system in which the variance of possible detection to interdiction sequences
becomes so great that system failure becomes prevalent. This critical speed will be
based on the geographic location and layout of the protected facility, the parameters
of the sensor network, and the interdiction agents that make up the counter
unmanned aerial system. Additionally, this study suggests that simulation modeling
may be a useful tool for determining the system parameters required for the desired
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level of protection (i.e. notification of an overflight vs. prevention of an overflight)
for a fixed facility, or can alternately suggest the appropriate makeup and placement
of sensors and interdiction methods from tested and well-documented elements of
a system. Simulation modeling may also be able to provide data to influence policy
currently restricting UAS interdiction at the federal level.
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